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ABSTRACT: Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception 
device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless self-
ascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled 
for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating tho-
roughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the tran-
scendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the 
debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first – exemplified in 
the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell – considers the features of the I 
think according to Wittgenstein’s approach to the I as subject while the second, exempli-
fied by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein 
in order to interpret Kant’s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in 
this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from 
the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant’s reflection 
on the problem of self-identification lies right here, truly prefiguring some features of 
Wittgenstein’s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophi-
cal horizons. 
KEYWORDS: Empirical apperception – Kant – self-identification – self-reference – tran-
scendental apperception – Wittgenstein. 
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 In a well-known passage Wittgenstein (1958, 66-67) introduces his phi-
losophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I, where 
he distinguishes two types of uses, the use as object (‘I have grown six 
inches’) and the use as subject (‘I have toothache’): 
One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: 
The cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular 
person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error . . . On the 
other hand there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I 
have toothache. To ask “are you sure it’s you who have pains?” would 
be nonsensical. 
 This passage should be considered as part of the philosophical frame-
work articulated by Wittgenstein starting from the 1930s on the basis of 
some theses that might be regarded as the background for the analyses of 
the two uses of I.2 While the I used as object performs a referential function 
relative to the body and to physical features in general, the I used as subject 
apparently regards mental states as well as processes and no subject identifi-
cation is taken into account.3
It would make no sense to think or say: This inner experience is occur-
ring, but is it occurring to me? (This feeling is hunger; but is it I who 
am feeling it?) 
 
 Likewise, Strawson (1966, 165) argues that in the self-ascription of  
a mental state (e.g., ‘I’m hungry’), a subject of experiences uses the term  
I employing no identification criteria: 
                                                     
2  For example: a) the irreducibility of the manifold ‘games’ that build up language, 
whose rules are to be made explicit in order to solve any sort of philosophical problem; 
b) anti-referentialism, which lies on the recognition of the manifold functions per-
formed by language as well as on the necessity to avoid the erroneous search for the use 
of a sign on the basis of the object-sign relation; c) anti-mentalism, for which suggest-
ing that thinking is a mental activity is misleading. 
3  From a Wittgensteinian angle, the I used as subject has no referential function: ac-
cording to this thesis – supported by Geach (1957), Hacker (1972), and Anscombe 
(1975) – it is just our inclination to assume that a linguistic term has a meaning only if 
it stands for an object that induces us to believe that the I used as subject denotes the 
thinking subject, mind, soul, etc. Cf. Sluga (1996); Wright (1998). 
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More precisely, Strawson refers to criterionless selfascription. On the other 
hand – unlike Wittgenstein, as we shall see – the absence of an identifica-
tion device does not entail that the use of I will not perform a referential 
function.  
 Some judgments bearing a first-person reference (e.g., ‘I have pain’) dis-
play what Shoemaker (1968, 565) defines self-reference without identification 
(which is linked to the feature of the essential indexical I singled out by 
Kaplan, Castañeda and Perry): 
My use of the word “I” as the subject of my statement is not due to my 
having identified as myself something of which I know, or believe, or 
wish to say, that the predicate of my statement applies to it. 
In other words, in the self-ascriptions of mental properties, the self-
reference underlying some self-conscious forms occurs without any infe-
rence from conceptual properties ascribable to the subject: there is no pre-
vious identification of something as its own self owing to properties that 
can be ascribed to that same something. Due to the absence of any identifi-
cation component, some singular judgments involving the self-ascription of 
mental (and physical, as will be seen) properties are immune to error through 
misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM). The subject 
formulating this sort of judgments in given epistemic contexts cannot be 
mistaken as to whether it is he who is attributing a particular mental prop-
erty to his own self. 
 In his turn, Evans goes beyond the terms of the matter as suggested by 
Wittgenstein and, to some extent, by Shoemaker. In some self-ascriptions, 
self-reference is direct and unmediated: as Evans notes, here we are dealing 
with identification-free self-reference. In particular, Evans (1982, 220) con-
tends that a judgment of the kind ‘I am F’ is identification-free unless it cor-
responds to the inferential conclusion drawn from the two premises, i.e.,  
‘a is F’ (predication component) and ‘I am a’ (identification component), such 
judgment is based on the unmediated self-ascription of properties through 
introspective consciousness (as is the case with mental properties) or pro-
prioception (as with physical properties). For example, according to our 
general capacity to perceive bodies, to our sense of proprioception, of bal-
ance, of heat and cold, and of pressure, the kind of information generated 
by each of these modes of perception seems to give rise to judgments that 
are immune to error through misidentification: 
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None of the following utterances appears to make sense when the first 
component expresses knowledge gained in the appropriate way: ‘Some-
one’s legs are crossed, but is it my legs that are crossed?’ (Evans 1982, 
220) 
 Peacocke’s (1999; 2008) strategy in its turn consists in tracing IEM 
proprieties back to more fundamental characterizations. More precisely, 
Peacocke (1999, 274) distinguishes between a representationally dependent 
and a representationally independent use of the first-person concept in or-
der to define what he terms delta account. The point at issue here is pri-
marily epistemological as it concerns the philosophical branch of self-
knowledge as well as the possibility of forming beliefs relative to the self-
ascription of mental and physical properties. While the representationally 
dependent use of the first-person concept is based on the fact that the sub-
ject is represented in the content of the judgment, in the representationally 
independent use of the first-person concept the very occurrence of a partic-
ular experience (e.g., visual, its content being, in Peacocke’s example, ‘I see 
the phone is on the table’) determines the reason why the subject is justi-
fied in making a judgment about herself, without the thinking subject be-
ing represented in the judgment itself: 
the explanation is just the occurrence of the experience itself to its sub-
ject. Nor does any thought or representation of herself as the subject of 
the experience enter her reasons for her judgement. (Peacocke 1999, 
273) 
Mutatis mutandis, Recanati (2007; 2009) employs a similar strategy through 
a philosophical analysis on the distinction between de re and de se thoughts, 
a distinction gained by Chilsholm, Lewis and Perry. The author distin-
guishes two types of self-ascriptions, two types of de se thoughts – implicit de 
se and explicit de se – according to the presence or absence of the represen-
tational reference of the subject in terms of judgment content. Although 
very problematically, Peacocke relates the IEM phenomenon to the repre-
sentationally independent use of the concept I, and in the same way Reca-
nati finds a link between IEM and implicit de se thoughts. As will be seen, 
Peacocke appeals to the representationally independent use of I to explain 
the origin of the transcendental subject in Kant. 
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 The question of the identification of the subject in the transcendental 
apparatus can be developed through two theoretical dimensions. Firstly, it 
is necessary to introduce a metaphysical reflection on the transcendental 
subject in order to detect the characterizations assigned to transcendental 
apperception and contained in several passages of the Transcendental De-
duction and Paralogisms sections: from the point of view of spontaneity of 
understanding, I manifests itself neither as it is nor as phenomenon. Se-
condly, within the transcendental constraints characterizing the designation 
of the I of the I think, I will discuss the empirical dimension and the epis-
temic conditions in and under which the subject reveals himself in the 
temporal sphere of receptivity. 
 As is well known, transcendental constraints represent the conditions 
of possibility of experience and knowledge, and in the final analysis they 
are based on transcendental apperception, i.e., on self-consciousness, 
which, via the I think, Kant regards as the highest point of transcendental 
philosophy. Apperception is the foundation of representational synthesis 
in order for knowledge to occur, and the I think must be able to accom-
pany every representation: regarded as an analytical unity of apperception, 
the representation I produced by apperception is a feature of every repre-
sentation as the I think must be able to accompany each representation; 
regarded, on the other hand, as a synthetical unity of apperception, the  
I produced by apperception is a feature of representations synthesized ho-
rizontally, which calls in question the categories’ claim to have objective 
validity and to be predicates of objects in general, so that the judgments 
can be formed wherever knowledge arises. Although it presents the 
thinking subject as substantial, simple, identical in time and separate 
from body, the I of the I think is not the concept of an object but refers 
to ‘something in general (transcendental subject)’ in which thoughts in-
here as its own predicates. 
 Pure apperception is original consciousness and can be expressed by 
sum. Here, as emphasized by Capozzi (2007, 288), an ontological question 
arises: sum is nothing but activity – which has nothing receptive about it – 
as it will not mingle with any element of the sensible dimension; hence, it 
is a thinking activity to the extent that sum and cogito are on a par: in the 
first act of knowledge, “I am a thinking thing is a tautology.” The ontolog-
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ical question is specified in the assertion that “the subject bound to the first 
act of knowledge, to former apperception, is the first subject as well as the 
first Wesen being thought: with the first act of knowledge, the subject is 
the being itself.” 
 From this metaphysical perspective emerge a few characterizations of 
the transcendental subject which may explain the lack of identification in 
representational synthesis. On the one hand, the I think/I am is a formal 
condition of all thinking: “the I think must be able to accompany all repre-
sentations” (KrV B 132). On the other hand, this subject/being is some-
thing in general, unidentifiable from an epistemic point of view; it is an in-
tellectual self-existence awareness summarized by the I am or I think repre-
sentations which accompany every other representation and, as such, don’t 
present any propriety. In point of fact, due to the absence of intuition, it is 
not possible to determine whether that something is existent as a persistent 
substance in order to make knowledge: 
The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition at 
all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity of  
a thinking subject. (KrV B 278) 
In the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself 
not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. 
This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting. (KrV B 157). 
 What is being assumed on the basis of the representation I is just an ex-
istent devoid of any propriety. The subject is able to know that he exists as 
a thinking activity, but he is not able to know what he is: the subject’s be-
ing is inaccessible from an epistemic point of view, and what is given is 
nothing but thoughts regarded as his predicates, which do not enable us to 
grasp the thinking subject’s nature. In a famous passage Kant states: 
Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further 
is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is 
recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about 
which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept. (KrV A 
346/B 404) 
 Accordingly, there emerge a few peculiarities of the self-referential ap-
paratus involved in transcendental apperception: “the subject of inherence 
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is designated only transcendentally through the I that is appended to 
thoughts, without noting the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing 
anything at all about it” (KrV A 355). It follows that the act of reference 
performed by the subject to refer to her own self entails no mediation of 
knowing, namely it involves no identification by means of properties ascrib-
able to the subject herself. 
 With the notion of transcendental designation, Kant anticipates some of 
the self-reference without identification features (cf. Howell 2000; and Brook 
2001). The condition of possibility of all judgments relies on the act I think 
and, at this level, the intellectual representation I designates only transcen-
dentally, no conceptual mediation being involved: it is a simple representa-
tion bearing no content and solely referring to something in general, namely 
to a transcendental subject: “its properties [of subject] are entirely abstracted 
from if it is designated merely through the expression ‘I’, wholly empty of 
content (which I can apply to every thinking subject)” (KrV A 355). An emp-
ty or bare form (cf. KrV A443/B471), I designates but does not represent (cf. 
KrV A 381; Kant 1786, 542-543). The difference is important, the I desig-
nates the transcendental subject without representing it, i.e. without any 
content mediation and therefore without any prior instance of identification 
because the I is not a conceptual representation, articulable in conceptual 
marks, nor an intuitional one, which presupposes a relation to the sensible 
spatio-temporal forms, but is a ‘simple’ or ‘empty’ representation.  
3 
 The analysis of the form of the I is intertwined with several epistemic and 
metaphysical questions. In general, it should be highlighted that the absence 
of an identification component does not imply that the I doesn’t perform a 
referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical 
thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. As a matter of fact, the  
I-thoughts self-reference features have been supported by both a materialist 
conception regarding the self-conscious subject as a bodily object – for exam-
ple, by Strawson and Evans – and a different metaphysical framework, as in 
Wittgenstein’s eliminativist thesis or in Kant’s exclusion thesis.4
                                                     
4  At face value, Kant suggests a metaphysical thesis of exclusion according to which 
the I of the I think as intellectual representation produces no knowledge as to the nature 
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 The point at issue here is the possible contiguity between the analysis 
of the form of I think and the contemporary reflections on the question of 
self-identification: although it is possible to find different elements of af-
finity, the theoretical contexts are still deeply distant. 
 With his transcendental designation, Kant does not certainly seem 
anachronistic with respect to the considerations raised by the contemporary 
debate. On the contrary, at least as far as the genesis of the Cartesian illu-
sion on the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned – one of the 
issues addressed in the Blue Book – Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share 
the same philosophical concerns and both focus, although not exclusively, 
on the type of reference involved by the I, of course through very different 
philosophical paths, and, as already said, with what at first may appear to be 
antipodal metaphysical assumptions. 
 Wittgenstein (1958, 43) starts from the analysis of language and the use 
of the I as subject to dissolve any question on the nature of the ego in an 
anti-metaphysical key. Philosophical inquiry must investigate only the 
grammars of the mentalistic terms used and no metaphysical distinction be-
tween the mental and the physical should follow from the distinction be-
tween propositions describing facts of the world and propositions describ-
ing psychological experiences. It is necessary to analyze the uses and related 
grammars of terms such as thinking, meaning, wishing because the investiga-
tion “rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, inde-
pendent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some 
peculiar medium”. Thinking is using signs according to rules and philo-
sophical difficulties may arise only from the misleading use of language 
                                                     
of the thinking subject, and refers only to something which is no object: the transcen-
dental subject. At the same time, the empty form of the referential apparatus in tran-
scendental apperception has been appraised in intrinsically different ways, from Heinrich 
and Guyer’s Substantial Ownership Reading to the Formal Ownership Reading upheld by 
Allison and Ameriks, and, more recently, by Bermúdez (1994). Further, more than once 
an elusive reading suggesting that the I of the I think has no reference has been argued, 
i.e., the so-termed No-Ownership Reading; the close affinity between Wittgenstein and 
Kant alleged by some commentators lies within this framework – cf. Becker (1984), 
Sturma (1985), Powell (1990), McDowell (1994). In this paper, contiguity between 
Wittgenstein and Kant on this issue is refused, since, as already pointed out, the I of the 
I think has a referential function which refers to the transcendental subject. 
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which leads us to look for something that might correspond to a noun. 
This may be the case in the use of the I as subject.  
 The referential thesis according to which the use of a sign is based on 
its relation with the object – strongly criticized when taken as the sole basis 
to explain the semantics of the language, along with the proper considera-
tion that some uses of the I do not denote physical properties – leads to 
false Cartesian metaphysical conclusions:  
We feel then that in the cases in which “I” is used as subject, we don’t 
use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteris-
tics; and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to some-
thing bodiless, which however, has its seat in our body. In fact this 
seem to be the real ego, the one of which it was said, “Cogito ergo 
sum”. (Wittgenstein 1958, 69)  
 In no way is the question of the absence of identification in the use of 
the I lacking in Kant, as already seen with the transcendental designation of 
the I of the I think. Given that there is no empirical intuition, the I of the  
I think cannot be based on public employment through the identifying 
mediation of properties attributable to the transcendental subject. Howev-
er, and in contrast to Wittgenstein, in the first place Kant moves from  
a metaphysical reflection in the sense of transcendental idealism concerning 
the conditions of possibility of experience and knowledge and from the 
transcendental assertion that the I think is the center of such conditions. 
Philosophical inquiry can only analyze the formal constraints of knowledge. 
In revealing the genesis of the illusion of a Cartesian immaterial ego, main-
ly addressed in the analysis of paralogisms, Kant argues that nothing about 
the metaphysical order and the ontological nature of the transcendental 
subject can be elicited from the conscious form of unity of apperception 
and from the representational order of the I think: the I of the I think is 
not a concept of an object, but an empty representation, ‘the concept of  
a mere something’. 
 Needless to say, it was Strawson himself who insisted on the characteri-
zations of the form of the I think: based on some arguments recalling Witt-
genstein’s theses in more than one way, Strawson (1966, 166) claims that 
Kant has revealed the source of the Cartesian error from a purely internal 
referential use of the I, which severs all ties with the ordinary and empirical 
criteria of self-identity. At the same time, Strawson criticizes Kant for not 
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considering explicitly, as a condition of possibility of experience, the re-
quirement that the subject is recognizable as an object of intuition, a thesis 
further developed by Evans (1982) and Cassam (1997), and challenged, in 
its turn, by some Kantian commentators (cf. infra). 
 Although Peacocke does not explicitly mention Strawson, he none-
theless uses his same type of argument against Kant, stating that the 
German philosopher would have mistaken an epistemological phenome-
non for a metaphysical one. The author refers, among others, to the 
above-mentioned KrV B 404 passage to specify the notion of transcen-
dental subject: this is not an empirically determinable object through the 
application of the categories and it can only be known through the 
thoughts regarded as its own predicates. This metaphysical conclusion of 
exclusion can only stem from a failure to recognize the representationally 
independent use of the I of the I think, which is the form of any judgment; 
yet, as such, it neither presents the subject in the content of the judg-
ment itself, nor can determine or identify it a fortiori (see Peacocke 1999, 
284).  
 Now, for those who harbor sympathies for the hypothesis according to 
which Kant asserts a metaphysical thesis of exclusion (cf. supra, footnote 4), 
Peacocke’s argument might be reversed in its turn by contending that Kant 
may have held a metaphysical position on the exclusion of the transcenden-
tal subject from the metaphysical order of reality to generate the epistemic 
phenomenon of the representationally independent use of I, not vice versa. 
For those wishing to recall the Formal Ownership Reading and the above-
mentioned Kantian arguments contained in the analysis of paralogisms, it is 
not possible to elicit any metaphysical conclusion about the transcendental 
subject from the formal and representational order of the I think. Indeed, 
when Kant focuses on the logic exposition of apperception, he describes the 
transcendental subject’s function through a completely abstract locution 
such as Das Denken (see KrV B 428-9). At this transcendental level for the 
simple thought the thinking thing is the being itself and shows no proprie-
ties at all, to the extent that Kant leaves even the pronoun indeterminate 
(‘I’, ‘he’, ‘it’), and yet he points out that it is a something in general, i.e., 
the transcendental subject. 
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 Therefore – at last we are thus confronted with the assessments 
marking the distance between Kant’s approach and contemporary reflec-
tions – considerations on the I of the I think rest at a very different level 
of investigation than the contemporary approaches. The transcendental 
unity of apperception is the foundation of representational synthesis, 
through which an objective determination of representations arises for 
possible cognition: each empirical manifold given in the intuitions of sen-
sibility is determined by the functions of the power of judgment based on 
the application of the categories of understanding that bring it back to 
consciousness. In this sense, every manifold bears a necessary relation 
with the I think that is the foundation of the necessary unity of the objec-
tively valid connection of all representations expressed by the judgment. 
In this picture, the I think resides in a metaphysical frame which neces-
sarily involves any thinking activity since it does identify with such activi-
ty. At least at this level of investigation, and with respect to the passages 
considered, this represents the highest level of abstraction in the tran-
scendental reflection.  
 At the same time, in transcendental self-consciousness, the self-
attributions of any thought (and also of a transcendental category: I think 
substance, cause, etc.) are not based on identification component relative to 
the representation I underlying the determination of those thoughts: as al-
ready remarked, although the representation I designates the transcenden-
tal subject, it cannot be determined to identify the thinking entity as em-
pirical object (cf. KrV A 346/B 404). 
 However, if the act of spontaneity expressed by the I think is necessarily 
involved in the making of any judgment, the lack of identification compo-
nent entailed in the transcendental designation appears to be totally empty 
of meaning: the Kantian reflections on the I think cannot articulate the dif-
ferent types of singular judgments expressing self-ascriptions of mental and 
physical properties as these regard form and condition of possibility of any 
kind of judgment, regardless of the particular use of I (as subject or as object, 
in Wittgensteinian terms) involved in the singular judgments produced. In 
other words, and more concretely, the transcendental designation mechan-
ism of the I think cannot account for the presence or absence of subjective 
identification component relative to the first person in judgments such as  
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‘I have grown six inches’ or ‘I have toothache’ since that is the condition of 
possibility of both. 
 In this regard, Longuenesse (2012) distinguishes two different uses of 
the I as subject. The first use is relative to Strawson and Evans, as well as 
Cassam (cf. Longuenesse 2006), who point to the consciousness of the self 
as a spatio-temporally located object and to the channels from which the 
subject draws information about himself so as to produce possible IEM 
judgments relative to the first person. The second I as subject use, instead, 
relates to Kant’s position as well as to the subject’s awareness of mental un-
ity. Further, Longuenesse rejects Evans’s criticism against Kant – as a mat-
ter of fact, a criticism already made by Strawson (1966) and, years later, also 
emphasized by McDowell (1994) – whereby the I think presents a purely 
formal characterization which is not sufficient to account for the self-
referential capacity of the self-conscious subject. 
 Indeed, it seems difficult to compare two levels of investigation that are 
so different, mutatis mutandis highlighted in a different theoretical frame-
work by Perry (1986) and Recanati (1997): plainly, it is assumed that – 
starting from the I think – Kant articulates a metaphysical reflection also on 
the conditions of possibility of the identification mechanisms by applying 
the intellectual forms to the sensitive ones. Such reflection, as already said, 
is concerned, in contemporary terms, also with the self-knowledge domain, 
establishing that the transcendental subject cannot be the object of neither 
knowledge nor identification because it is not a phenomenon manifesting 
itself in time and space. For this reason, Kant’s I as subject is an empty 
form. However, perhaps less plainly, this thesis is an epistemological con-
clusion gained from a metaphysical reflection on the transcendental sub-
ject’s features, and rests on a different theoretical level than Wittgenstei-
nian reflections (cf. Carl 1997). It is therefore necessary to move to a differ-
ent level that is empirical apperception articulated by Kant from the sensi-
tive dimension of receptivity. 
5 
 Like Wittgenstein, Kant (1798, 135) also introduces the ‘I as subject’ 
and ‘I as object’ on the basis of the distinction between transcendental and 
empirical apperception but, as mentioned, their theoretical uses are com-
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pletely different. Such distinction determines that the subject can 
(re)present herself in two ways: through the I that thinks and through the 
I that intuits itself. In another passage Kant (AA 28, 224; cit. in Carl 1997, 
156) states that “the I can be taken in a twofold manner: I as human being 
and I as intelligence. I in the first sense means: I am an object of the inner 
and the outer sense. I in the second sense means that I am the object of the 
inner sense only.” Obviously, this does not imply that there are ‘two’s I’, on 
the contrary, the “I as a thinking being am one and the same subject with 
myself as a sensing being” (Kant 1798, 142). 
 From the angle of transcendental dimension, and abstracting from any 
modality of intuition, while I is a pure representation, transcendental ap-
perception does not render the thinking subject neither as noumenon nor 
as phenomenon: “I think myself only as I do every object in general from 
whose kind of intuition I abstract” (KrV B 429). 
 From the angle of the empirical dimension, considering the I think as 
an empirical proposition equivalent to the I exist thinking, there is no logi-
cal function any longer but only the determination of the subject at the 
level of existence, the object of intuition that necessarily involves inner 
sense: the I as object of the perception is revealed by empirical apperception 
as a phenomenon that unfolds through the form of time. On the side of re-
ceptivity, at first glance the consciousness of the self as object of perception 
appears variable: 
The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of 
our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it 
can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appear-
ances and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception. 
(KrV A 107) 
 Nonetheless, if the Kantian I as subject of thinking, i.e. transcenden-
tal apperception, is the condition of possibility of all judgments, only on 
empirical level of investigation some characterizations of the identifica-
tion mechanisms of the egological dimension may be added to one anoth-
er: empirical apperception involves the pure forms of sensibility that arti-
culate, in the specific terms of transcendentalism, the Wittgensteinian 
uses of the I as subject and I as object in judgments expressing self-
ascriptions of mental and physical properties. The argument can be arti-
culated as follows:  
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 1) In primis, also as regards empirical apperception, Kant rejects the 
possibility to move from the inner perception of something existing as 
thinking (what Kant calls ‘eine unbestimmte empirische Anschauung’) to 
the determination of this very something as existing substance in time and 
space, the forms of inner and outer sense through which all phenomena are 
given; differently, this would be no thought but matter. Indeed, the con-
sciousness of the self as contemplated by empirical apperception is the in-
ner perception of something that is not the object of outer sense (cf. Kant 
1783, 334).  
 2) Even so, according to the arguments drawn from Refutation of Ideal-
ism, it is necessary to introduce the external sense on another plane: for the 
subject to determine its existence in time, it is necessary to assume the ex-
istence of objects perceived by outer sense, starting with the subject’s very 
body.5
                                                     
5  Taking the cue from Allison (2004, 298), who maintains that in the framework of 
Refutation of idealism “one’s body functions as the enduring object, with reference to 
which one’s existence is determined in time”, several scholars, such as Cassam (1993) 
and Hanna (2000), have questioned the notion of ‘embodied subject’ in Kant’s reflec-
tion. The historical-critical reconstruction by Capozzi (2007) clarifies some aspects of 
the issue. 
 Thus, following Capozzi (2007), in the consciousness of the self ly-
ing on the empirical determination of inner perception – i.e., on the sub-
ject’s capability to perceive himself, principally in the paradigmatic instance 
of the psychological mechanism of attention as something that thinks 
while apprehending representations in the psychological flow towards the 
outside – I reveals itself as an intuition and phenomenises, de facto obtain-
ing indirectly a persistence which exceeds the afore-mentioned variable na-
ture of empirical apperception.  
 3) This does not imply that the subject phenomenizing in empirical 
apperception, and which requires outer sense in order to be determined in 
time as inner phenomenon, can account for an instance of identification. 
Just as the I as subject in transcendental apperception poses no question of 
identification – it is neither a phenomenon nor a noumenon – the I as ob-
ject of empirical apperception cannot account for any instance of identifica-
tion: it is a phenomenon that unfolds in time only. What is more, the tem-
poral nature of experience, in the absence of space, allows us to count 
numbers but not to identify objects. 
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6 
 According to Kant, it is possible to refer to Erkenntnis, which is always 
discursive, only as regards the product of the application of conceptual forms 
to forms of sensibility, and only with reference to both pure forms of sensi-
bility: time and space. If in the first pure intuition all possible representa-
tions are revealed, in space there appears only a specific sub-class of repre-
sentations, i.e., those referring to sheer external objects. Thanks to space 
itself – the form of outer sense – the objects are represented as something 
real and different from the subject. Only through a spatio-temporal collo-
cation the object is knowable in the strict sense, and the relative represen-
tations become Erkenntnis. 
 As to the empirical apperception features, the activity of thinking (I ex-
ist thinking) only manifests itself in time, not space, as has been said: it fol-
lows that the representation I cannot turn into knowledge, since, paradoxi-
cally, this would require an intuition in space, i.e., in the form of sensibility 
wherein the only representations refer to what is represented as something 
different from the subject. For this reason, the subject cannot determine it-
self as object within inner sense (see KrV A 22-3/B 37). 
 On the basis of the instances of distinction of time and of the re-
identification of space – and, obviously, of the application of the conceptual 
dimension – not only is it possible to count numbers but also objects, i.e., 
it is possible to know a world of objects, different from the subject, which 
bear properties and are endowed with identification conditions. On the 
other hand, time, without space, represents phenomena as belonging to the 
thinking subject’s internal sphere. For this reason, from the empirical di-
mension, the I think “expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e.,  
a perception” (KrV B 423 n.). Such is an empirical intuition because the 
empirical-existential proposition I think/I exist lies on a sensation which in-
deed belongs to sensibility and reveals itself only in time. Additionally, it is 
indeterminate due to the lack of space, i.e., the form in and through which 
objects manifest themselves and can be determined. In this context, it is 
clear that, in some self-attributions, the I of empirical apperception 
presents a Wittgensteinian use of the I as subject.  
 First of all the question concerns the judgment, the Prolegomena (Kant 
1783, 298) contains the famous distinction between judgments of perception 
and judgments of experience: the former have subjective validity only, while 
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judgments of experience involve the principles of understanding that make 
empirical judgments objectively valid. But some judgments of perception can 
never become judgments of experience due to their being solely based on 
subjective sensations or feelings (to readapt Kant’s examples: ‘I’m hot in this 
room’, ‘I am disgusted by wormwood’): while a dual reference to the sub-
ject’s experience and consciousness is required in order for representations 
to fall within the knowledgeable (cf. KrV A 320/B 376; Kant 1800, 33), the 
internal or subjective sensation (cf. Kant 1798, 156), thus equated to the 
Gefühl (cf. Kant 1790, 206), lacking an even potential reference to an object 
of reality – such as intuitions (in an immediate way) or concepts (in a me-
diate way) – is a representation exclusively connected with the subject and, 
for that reason, manifests itself only in time.6
 The second account focuses on the objectivity: in KrV (B §18-19) Kant 
points out the distinction between an objective unity of self-consciousness, 
which presupposes the use of categories, and subjective unity, which is only 
the product of the reproductive imagination. For this reason he criticizes 
the logicians’ definition of judgment as the “the representation of a relation 
between two concepts”, since they don’t specify what this relation amounts 
to and the rule of the copula: “That is the aim of the copula is in them: to 
 
 The distinction between judgment of experience and judgments of per-
ception has to be intended as a counterpart to the Transcendental Deduction 
(see Allison 2004, 179), and two accounts of judgment have been individu-
ated (cf. Allison 2004; Longuenesse 1998). The first considers the act of 
judgment as the unification of distinct representation in a concept that is 
correlated with a unity in the consciousness. Since “a concept is never im-
mediately related to an object, but is always related to some other represen-
tation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept)”, the 
judgment is the mediate cognition of an object, the representation of a rep-
resentation of it (see KrV A68/B93). Therefore, the judgment includes two 
concepts related both to each other and to object judged about (cf. KrV 
A68-69/B93-94). 
                                                     
6  In another passage Kant (1783, 334 n.) reaffirms that I, as a representation of apper-
ception, is no concept: “it is nothing more than a feeling of an existence without the 
least concept, and is only a representation of that to which all thinking stands in rela-
tion (relatione accidentis).” 
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distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective” 
(KrV B 142). 
 From a Kantian point of view, and with regard to the forms of sensibili-
ty and understanding, a judgment such as ‘I’m hot’ doesn’t involve an iden-
tification component since it consists of perceptions revealed in time only, 
whose nexus cannot involve any pure concept of understanding, and there-
fore the objective unity of apperception, because there is no object directed 
to the outer sense to be determined and, therefore, identified.  
 The heart of the matter changes in the self-ascriptions of properties 
manifesting themselves in time and space which thus refer to a spatio-
temporally located subject/body. If the thinking being, as a human being, is 
at the same time an object of outer sense (cf. KrV B 415), from a Kantian 
point of view, a judgment such as ‘I have a dirty hand’ is a judgment of expe-
rience in that it involves an outer object – the body – and the principles of 
pure understanding, which are based on the categories applied to the for-
mal conditions of a possible intuition: the nexus of the representations is 
necessarily produced by the presence of the object which affects sensibility 
and is objectively valid through the intervention of the intellectual dimen-
sion thus determining the object. 
 Obviously, this concerns the conditions making a judgment of expe-
rience possible based on the relations between forms of thoughts and 
forms of sensibility considered as rules which, according to the Coperni-
can revolution, represent the universal laws without which nature in gen-
eral, as object of sense, could not be thought (cf. Kant 1790, 183). It goes 
without saying that the transcendental account cannot tell whether the 
judgment ‘I have a dirty hand’ is true or false, it provides the conditions 
of possibility required to produce an assertive Erkenntnissatz, which can 
be confirmed or denied, with regard to the attribution of the predicate, 
since the hand of the person having made such judgment may not be dir-
ty, as well as to the subject’s identification. If the judgment is produced 
on the basis of the reflected image of a tangle of hands in a mirror, the 
dirty hand might not belong to the person who has produced the judg-
ment but, rather, to someone else. In this context, a judgment of experi-
ence expressing the self-attribution of a subject/body physical property in-
volves a subject’s identification component as, in point of fact, the subject 
can be mistaken as to whether he is the one who is attributing himself 
this particular property.  
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 Therefore, only with the objective unity of apperception it is possible to 
make a truth-evaluable judgment (i.e. a judgment of experience) that con-
tains a identification component and consequently makes Erkenntnis possi-
ble; instead a judgment that doesn’t involve the objective unity of apper-
ception (i.e. a judgment of perception) is not truth-evaluable, so doesn’t in-
clude an identification component. 
7 
 In conclusion, following Kitcher (2000, 34) it is true that Kant and 
Wittgenstein start from what at first glance might appear to be different 
theses so that ‘it is an interpretive and philosophical mistake to try to 
force an alliance between what are, in fact, deeply opposed camps’. At the 
same time, following Carl (1997, 149) it is true that Kant’s distinction of 
the ‘I as subject’ and the ‘I as object’ is not concerned with Wittgenstein’s 
project of distinguishing different kinds of predicates to be ascribed to 
oneself, but is concerned with an epistemological perspective focusing on 
the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, seen as conditions of 
all possible knowledge, in order to give an account which incorporates the 
I as subject of apperception into the foundation of the formal conditions 
of knowledge. 
 However, it is also true that, even seen via different philosophical hori-
zons, they both come to similar conclusions: the I used as subject concerns 
the self-attributions of mental properties and involves no instance of iden-
tification, while the I used as object concerns the self-attributions of physical 
properties and the subject’s identification will be provided.  
 As already seen, the question is further articulated in the transcendental 
and empirical dimension and can be connected to Carl’s (1997, 157) dis-
tinction between two classes of self-ascriptions, the kind of self-ascriptions 
that considers the ‘I as passive’ related to receptivity and the other sort of 
self-ascriptions that regards the ‘I as active’ related to spontaneity:  
 a) Since it is necessarily involved in the making of any judgment, the  
I as subject of thinking, which means pure apperception, is the condition of 
possibility of the Wittgensteinian uses of the I as subject and I as object in 
judgments expressing self-ascriptions of mental and physical properties: as 
already remarked, although the representation I designates the transcen-
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dental subject, it cannot be determined to identify the thinking entity and 
thus always lacks the identification component. 
 b) For the I as passive of empirical apperception, there are two possibili-
ties: b.1) if the subject reveals itself only in time, the self-attributions con-
cern only mental properties and so there is no question of identification, the 
I is used as subject in judgment of perception; b.2) if the subject reveals itself 
in time and space, the question of identification arises since there is an ex-
plicit self-attribution of body physical property relative to I which is used as 
object in a judgment of experience. This Kantian reading is also obtained 
through a reflection on the sources of epistemic sensibility and mediation of 
the forms of time and space and, also for this reason, it must be included in  
a very different theoretical framework from Wittgenstein’s.7
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